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Battle of hurtgen forest (Click to select text)
Battle of the Hurtgen Forest September 19 - December 8, 1944 September, 1944. Allied forces were pushing into Germany. General Courtney Hodges wanted to close to the Rhine River, and to do that required driving Nazi forces out of the Hurtgen Forest. Laying on the German-Belgian border, just east of the Roer River, the forest was about 50 square miles. It was densely wooded, with fir trees that reached 20-30 meters into the air. Lack of sunlight turned the forest floor into a dark, damp place devoid of underbrush. Sgt. George Morgan, 4th Division, describes it best: "The forest was a helluva eerie place to fight. You can't get protection. You can't see. You can't get fields of fire. Artillery slashes the trees like a scythe. Everything is tangles. You can scarcely walk. Everybody is cold and wet, and the mixture of cold rain and sleet keeps falling. They jump off again, and soon there is only a handful of the old men left." (Ambrose, p. 167) Not only were the fighting conditions horrible, but the reason for the soldiers to be there was meaningless. If Allied troops got to the river valley, the Germans to the north could release the Roer's Dams and flood the valley. The forest without Roer's dams was completely useless. The real objective should have been the Dams, which would have been a priceless asset to the Allies. The plan of attack was also severely flawed, turning the campaign into one of the most useless battles in the European Theater of Operations. On September 19, the 3rd Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions began the attack. Lieutenants and captains soon found that controlling their men was impossible. The troops couldn't see but a few feet past their faces. The forest contained no clearings, and only narrow trails. When the German troops saw the Allied troops from their bunkers, they called in presighted artillery fire. The few roads that allowed passage of vehicles were either too muddy, too heavily mined or too narrow to allow passage, thus rendering tank and jeep assistance unavailable. Air support was also not available. Sgt. Mack Morris described the situation, "Hurtgen had its firebreaks, only wide enough to allow two jeeps to pass, and they were mined and interdicted by machine-gun fire. There was a Teller mine every eight paces for three miles. Hurtgen's roads were blocked. The Germans cut roadblocks from trees. They cut them down so they interlocked as they fell. Then they mined and booby trapped them. Finally they registered their artillery on the, and the mortars, and at the sound of men clearing them they opened fire." In September, the 9th and 2nd Armored Divisions lost 80% of their front line troops while gaining almost no ground. There were 4,500 casualties on the Allied side, and only 3,000 meters were gained. By November 13, all officers in rifle companies had been killed or wounded. Nearly every front line soldier was a casualty. Between November 7 and December 3, losses were 167%. The GI's wanted desperately to call off the attack. They could see the pointlessness of the endeavor firsthand. They were dying for absolutely no gain. The generals, however, continued the operation. Every time the Allies would attack, the German forces would overwhelm them with machine gun, rifle fire and morters. When they would be close to being overrun, the German forces would fall back a few hundred meters to prepared bunkers and began to shell their previous position. Soldiers began breaking under the strain. On November 6, and entire company broke and retreated, throwing their equipment as they ran and leaving wounded soldiers where they lay, their cries for assistance ignored. In late November, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, veterans of D-Day, entered the forest. The Rangers were an elite unit that had been trained better than most soldiers. According to Lieutenant Len Lomell, "Our Rangers tactics seemed to be needed, stealthful and speedy infiltration and surprise assaults where they were not expected at first light. The bigger outfits were too visible. We could sneak into the line." (Ambrose, 174) Their objective was Hill 400, which was also the main objective of the Hurtgen campaign. First Army has sent 4 divisions against Hill 400 to no avail. Each attack was driven back. Hundreds had lost their lives for no gain. On December 6, a desperate 8th Division called for the Ranger's assistance. At first light they attacked. Many remember the battle as worse than D-Day. The Rangers took the Germans by surprise. They pinned down the Germans with small arms fire while others threw grenades into the bunkers. They chased the retreating German forces almost to the Roer River before pulling back to the top to defend the hill. It was 0830 hours when the Rangers took the hill. An hour later, the first counterattack began. Major George Williams said of the counterattacks, "In some cases Germans were in and around the bunker on the hill before the Rangers were aware of their presence. Once on the hill they attempted to rush the positions. They used machine guns, burp guns, rifles, and threw potato masher grenades. Hand-to-hand fights developed on top of the hill in which some use was made of bayonets" (Ambrose, 176) The counterattacks lasted through the day and into the night. Iron Crosses and two weeks leave were offered to any who could retake the hill. The Rangers were grossly outnumbered, but they held the hill. On December 8, the Rangers were relieved. A week and two days later the hill was retaken by the Germans. The Americans would not get the hill back until February 1945. It marked the end of the Hurtgen campaign. The Hurtgen campaign had lasted 90 days. The dams upstream were not controlled, so the Americans dared not go any further. The entire operation was a waste. Nine divisions plus supporting units were involved on the American side. There were 24,000 casualties, plus 9,000 victims of trench foot, disease or combat fatigue. Gen. Rolf von Gersdorff said of the battle, "I have engaged in the long campaigns in Russia as well as other fronts and I believe the fighting in the Hurtgen was the heaviest I have ever witnessed." (Ambrose, 178) The campaign did not shorten the war by any amount of time. It contributed to a unbelievable amount of casualties for so little gain. The decision to fight the battle was one of the worst decisions made by the Americans in the war. Lieutenant Lomell put it best when he said, "The months-long battle of the Hurtgen Forest was a loser that our top brass ever after never seemed to want to talk about" (Ambrose, 179) Bibliography Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers New York, Touchstone 1997 Ambrose, Stehpen E. Band of Brothers New York, Touchstone 1992 "When Trumpets Fade" dir. John Irvin 1998 http://www.worldwar2timeline.dial.pipex.com http://metalab.unc.edu/hyperwar
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